Twenty-six countries say they’re ready to put boots on the ground in Ukraine—once the shooting stops. That’s the headline from Paris, where French President Emmanuel Macron said a broad coalition is preparing a security presence to support Ukraine after a ceasefire or peace deal. The idea is to move fast the day the guns fall silent, not months later.
What was agreed—and what wasn’t
Macron framed it as a reassurance mission, not a combat deployment. Troops would stay out of contact zones and operate only in areas still being mapped out with Kyiv. He and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, who co-chair the group, made one thing clear: this plan needs the United States. Without Washington’s political and military backing, the coalition will struggle to scale.
The meeting brought together European leaders, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and U.S. envoy for peace talks Steve Witkoff. Ukraine wants credible guarantees that any ceasefire won’t just freeze the front. Zelenskyy called the scope of participation a victory and said, “We are counting on a US backstop,” with details expected soon from Washington.
Which countries are in? Macron named Italy and Germany among the 26. Poland publicly ruled out sending ground troops, a reminder that political red lines still differ across the continent. Only the UK, France, and Estonia have officially said they would commit ground forces. For the rest, contributions could mean air defense units, naval patrols, logistics, engineers, medics, or trainers.
Two other guardrails were spelled out. First, no one is moving before a ceasefire or peace agreement. Second, the legal and political paperwork needs to be ready in advance so troops and equipment can deploy quickly when the signal comes. That means months of drafting status-of-forces agreements, mandate language, rules of engagement, and parliamentary approvals in capitals from Rome to Berlin.
Why the push now? European leaders don’t want a “day-after” security vacuum. In Bosnia and Kosovo, Western troops moved in quickly to stabilize fragile peace deals. Officials are attempting to replicate that tempo—protect critical infrastructure, help secure borders, and deter fresh attacks—while steering clear of frontline duty.
What this force might do—and the hurdles ahead
Macron gave only broad contours, but the mission’s likely tasks are already taking shape. Think integrated air defenses to shield cities and energy grids. Think demining teams clearing liberated land so displaced families can return. Think engineers restoring bridges and rail lines that armies and aid both need. And think trainers embedded alongside Ukrainian units, but away from active combat.
At sea, countries could offer maritime patrol aircraft and mine countermeasure ships to keep trade routes open and ports safe. In the air, rotating detachments could provide early warning and quick reaction air defense around key hubs. On land, troops might secure logistics corridors, ammunition depots, and critical infrastructure. The coalition wants flexibility to place assets where they matter most without creating tripwires on the front.
Legally, the path is narrow but workable. A United Nations mandate is unlikely because Russia holds a Security Council veto. So the legal basis would be the Ukrainian government’s invitation and bilateral or multilateral agreements with Kyiv. That’s similar to how NATO nations have operated in other theaters without UN cover, relying on host-nation consent and carefully drafted rules of engagement.
Politically, the picture is more mixed. Several governments need parliamentary votes to send troops abroad. In Germany and Italy, for instance, lawmakers typically sign off on deployments annually and scrutinize mission mandates line by line. In Central and Eastern Europe, there’s strong support for Ukraine but also caution about any step that could be framed as escalation.
That’s why the U.S. matters. European leaders want American logistics, intelligence, and political cover—even if the command structure sits outside NATO. A coalition operating beyond NATO’s formal umbrella avoids automatic alliance obligations while still benefiting from U.S. muscle. But if Washington’s support is thin or delayed, the force will be smaller, slower, and less credible to Moscow.
Money and materiel are another test. Air and missile defenses are scarce, and everyone wants them. Patriots, SAMP/T, NASAMS, IRIS-T—these systems are already stretched across Europe. Rotational cover is possible, but a sustained shield over Ukraine will require a production push and hard choices about who gets what and when.
Command and control will matter just as much as equipment. Expect a joint headquarters with national caveats—some countries agreeing to air defense but not ground patrols; others offering engineers but not gendarmes. The art will be knitting those pieces into a mission that looks unified to Ukrainians and deterrent to Russia.
What about the risks? Any post-war force operating in Ukraine will be in a contested information space and, potentially, a kinetic one. Even far from the front, bases can be targeted by missiles or drones. That implies layered defenses, hardened sites, and clear red lines about how the mission responds to attacks. The coalition wants to deter without stumbling into a new escalation spiral.
The timeline is deliberately vague. Leaders say operational planning is underway now so that legal and political approvals are banked before any ceasefire arrives. That’s a lesson learned from past conflicts: it’s easier to negotiate posture, permissions, and logistics now than to scramble after a deal is signed.
There’s also the question of how this force meshes with existing efforts. The EU runs a training mission for Ukrainian troops. Individual countries run bilateral programs. NATO coordinates military aid but has kept its distance from deployments inside Ukraine. The new plan looks like a bridge: a bespoke framework that slots in alongside these efforts but is tailored specifically for day-after security.
Public opinion will shape the edges of the mandate. In countries where voters strongly support Ukraine but worry about direct confrontation with Russia, leaders are signaling a stabilizing role: defense, training, reconstruction support, and deterrence—no patrols on trench lines. Expect more town-hall politics in European capitals as governments seek buy-in for deployments.
For Kyiv, the attraction is straightforward. A multinational presence makes it harder for Russia to test a ceasefire and easier to keep aid flowing. It also signals that Europe is investing in Ukraine’s long-term security, not just its immediate survival. Zelenskyy called the coalition a “victory” because it broadens the pool of countries willing to be physically present on Ukrainian soil after a deal—something that carries weight in Moscow and in Ukrainian towns that have lived under shelling.
For Paris and London, this is also about European agency. By co-chairing, Macron and Starmer are packaging a European-led plan that keeps the door open for U.S. support rather than waiting on it. It’s a pragmatic hedge: move the planning forward now, shape the mission’s design, and make it as easy as possible for Washington to plug in when it’s ready.
One more piece to watch is how the coalition marks out geography. Macron said troops would deploy in areas being defined now, not in contact zones. That could mean layered zones: logistics hubs deep in the rear; infrastructure protection around major cities; and border monitoring with allied support near crossings and critical corridors. Those lines will be drawn in careful talks with Kyiv’s military.
And the name of the game is speed. If a ceasefire comes, the coalition wants to land quickly, stand up air defense bubbles, unspool demining, and put trainers and engineers to work. To do that, equipment must be prepositioned, routes mapped, and units earmarked. That’s why planners are racing through legal language and force catalogs now, before politics gets noisy.
None of this changes the war’s brutal math today. But it does change the stakes for the day after. If the coalition can line up permissions, logistics, and sustained funding, the Ukraine reassurance force could give Kyiv breathing room to rebuild—and give Moscow second thoughts about testing a fragile peace.